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 Security is one of the major concerns of every 
industry in the world today. One of the best ways of 
hacking into a computer system is brute forcing. And with 
the increase in computing, brute forcing has become faster 
and easy to do.  
Text-based passwords are still the most popular and 
most commonly used form of authentication even though the 
requirements for a good password are still increasing. 
Research has shown that the best text-based passwords are 
the random ones that have no sequence or pattern to them. 
But this also makes it difficult to remember. Well-
documented research has shown that it is easier to remember 
an image than words, hence the adage “A picture is worth a 
thousand words.”  
Even though there are good policies for text-based 
passwords, the unpredictability of users’ attitudes and 
behavior has most of the time rendered these policies 
inefficient. The common trade-off for the complexity of 
text-based passwords is recallability. Most users would 
prefer to use a password they can easily remember than a 
complex one that they can easily forget. 
One of the proposed alternatives to text-based 
passwords is graphical passwords. There are several schemes 
that have been proposed but are still unpopular. 
This thesis investigated one of these schemes that are 
used on mobile devices to determine whether it can be used 
as an alternative to text-based passwords. Also this 
research proposes ways to improve this scheme and options 
of bringing it at par with the current minimum requirements 
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The number one concern of every organization in the 
world is the security of its assets. Depending on the value 
of the asset, the security level can range from a password 
to encryption keys, biometric scanners, and so on. “The 
number of mobile workers is rapidly increasing and most 
mobile workers will be relying on their smart phones in the 
course of their work” (Landman, 2010, p. 145). This can be 
true for other mobile devices such as laptops, tablets, 
etc. 
In a centralized system, intrusion and unauthorized 
access to the system is easily detectible since there is 
constant monitoring of the system by the information 
technology personnel. The same cannot hold true for most 
personal computer systems (desktops, laptops, tablets, 
smart phones, etc.). 
According to the research of Shay et al. (2010) on the 
habit and attitudes of computer users, “nearly 80% of users 




characters added to the beginning or end” (p. 12) despite 
the implementation of a new policy to check for dictionary 
words. Hence there has been a lot of research into the use 
of graphical-based passwords. One such password is the 
Android Unlocking Pattern (AUP), which instead of entering 
a numeric PIN to unlock the screen, a user must connect 
several dots to unlock their android mobile device. 
Statement of the Problem 
The fundamental problem of every security personnel is 
how to authenticate the users of the systems securely and 
conveniently (Shay et al., 2010). “A common problem with 
password-based methods is the low entropy available in 
user-chosen passwords, which may be used by an attacker to 
mount password-guessing attacks” (Halevi & Krawczyk, 1999, 
p. 231). Due to the unpredictability of user-chosen 
passwords, to determine the entropy of a user-chosen 
password is challenging, but the entropy of a text-based 
password can be calculated assuming the characters were 
randomly generated. 
In recent years, a number of devices and techniques 
have been proposed including smart cards, RFID cards, 
USB tokens, and graphical passwords to make 
authentication more usable, convenient, and secure. 
While each of these technologies has its advantages 
and may be well suited for use in a specific 




passwords remain the most commonly used authentication 
mechanism. This is in part because text-based 
passwords require no special hardware and are easy for 
end users to input and for system developers to 
implement. (Shay et al., 2010, p. 1) 
 
Text-based passwords are still the most commonly used 
method of authentication. “To combat both the inherent and 
user-induced weaknesses of text-based passwords, 
administrators and organizations typically institute a 
series of rules—a password policy—to which users must 
adhere when choosing a password” (Shay et al., 2010, p. 1) 
Even with the implementation of policies to make text-based 
passwords more secure, they can still be unpredictable 
because the behavior of users is still unpredictable. 
Without feedback from security experts, users created 
their own rules on password design that were often 
anything but secure. Dictionary words and names are 
the most vulnerable forms of passwords, but many users 
do not understand how password cracking works. (Adams 
& Sasse, 1999, p. 42) 
 
To counteract this issue, most security systems employ 
persuasive methods to guide the users in the choice of 
their passwords. One of these methods is the establishment 
of rules that predict the strength of the password.  
Some users also result to writing down their passwords 
or choose very simple passwords that would be more easily 
broken due to frequent password expirations as reported by 




According to several studies in learning in education, 
combining a visual aid with the human body’s motor sensors 
(doing an activity) promotes learning and better recall for 
students. Hence there has been a lot of research into the 
use of graphical passwords as an alternative to text-based 
passwords. Graphical passwords can provide the complexity 
needed for passwords and yet can also be easily recalled. 
Hypothesis 
Van Oorschot and Thorpe (2008), in their investigation 
of the Draw-A-Secret (DAS) graphical password scheme, 
defined the complexity of a DAS based on the password 
length, number of components, and symmetry. DAS is similar 
to AUP in that they both allow the user free reign to 
determine his or her authentication pattern. Hence the 
objects or pattern of a user’s AUP is not known until 
drawn. 
Unlike DAS (which uses a canvas), an AUP uses a grid 
of dots that need to be connected. But by increasing the 
size of the grid, can an expanded AUP (eAUP) provide better 
security than a text-based password? Van Oorschot and 
Thorpe (2008) suggested a method to predict and model a 
number of classes for systems where passwords are created 




classes define weak password subspaces suitable for an 
attack dictionary. “For user-drawn graphical passwords, we 
apply this method with cognitive studies on visual recall” 
(Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008, p. 1). 
The research of Van Oorschot and Thorpe (2008) was 
based on the Draw-A-Secret (DAS) scheme proposed by Jermyn, 
Mayer, Monrose, Reiter, and Rubin (1999). “We introduce a 
set of user-drawn graphical password complexity properties, 
including: password length, number of components, and 
symmetry. We model what we conjecture to be classes of 
higher-probability user-drawn graphical passwords based on 
these complexity properties” (Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008, 
p. 3). 
Hence, a hypothesis can be constructed as follows: By 
modifying the parameters of an AUP and a method to 
determine familiar or common patterns, an eAUP scheme can 
provide the same level of security as a text-based 
password.  
Research Question 
From the hypothesis, the research question can be 
constructed as: Can an eAUP provide the same level of 




Purpose of the Study 
In order for graphical passwords to replace text-based 
passwords, they need to offer the same level of, if not 
more, complexity and difficulty in hacking it. Increasing 
the complexity of the graphical password will make it 
difficult to crack. Also a predictive model will help 
prevent the use of familiar patterns that can easily be 
hacked. Furthermore, increasing the parameters of the AUP 
scheme can provide the same level of security as a text-
based password scheme. 
Hence, the main purpose of this research was to change 
the parameters of an AUP (to create eAUP) to increase its 
complexity. This was done to determine whether it was equal 
or better than a text-based password. Additionally, the 
study proposes a theoretical model for determining common 
patterns such as spirals, zigzags, polygon, squares, and 
rectangles in a constructed pattern using the geometric 
properties of these shapes. 
Significance and Justification of the Study 
The complexity of text-based password requirements has 
grown, making it increasingly more difficult for users to 
remember. Several studies have shown that although users 




make a systems security vulnerable. 
According to the studies of McDowell, Rafail, and 
Herman (2009) and Shay et al. (2010), the major trade-offs 
of password complexity are easy recall, so users tend to 
modify old passwords to create new ones, write them down, 
or share their passwords over time. 
Bragdon et al. (2010) found that users of the game 
“Gesture Play” had an improved short-term recall. User-
drawn graphical passwords combine two important qualities 
for recall: motor sensory and visual sensory. This research 
is a contribution to the ongoing research of graphical 
passwords, which can be a suitable alternative to 
graphical-based passwords. 
Limitation and Delimitations 
Due to time constraints, this research is limited to 
proposing a theoretical model for detecting familiar 
patterns such as squares, rectangles, spirals, and zigzags. 
This is to prove that a model can be constructed for user-
pattern choices using the geometric properties of familiar 
patterns. Correspondingly, in calculating the Space, 
Entropy, and minimum Length of a pattern for an eAUP 
scheme, known functions with slight modifications will be 




This research can be expanded to include a brute-force 
test of the eAUP as well as the construction of a working 
model of the eAUP to tests its usability in real time. 
Also, the modified equations are prone to errors, and 
further studies may be required to prove their accuracy.  
Furthermore, this research can also be expanded to 
cover the detection of other common and familiar patterns 
such as regular polygons, arcs, etc. 
Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made in the calculation 
of the entropy of an eAUP grid: 
1. A dot cannot be used more than once. 
2. A stroke follows an order in the direction of the 
stroke. Hence dots D1 follows D2 in an ordered system. 
3. Let N represent the space (the number of all 
possible passwords of length not greater than a specified 
character length in a symbols set).  
4. For an eAUP, grid size represents the total number 
of dots (that is, the horizontal length of the grid X the 
vertical length of the grid) divided by the length of a 
stroke (Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008). 





Definition of Terms 
The following terminologies are used in this context 
in the research:  
1. Space refers to the maximum possible dots that are 
available in an eAUB. 
 2. Entropy is the measure of uncertainty of a random 
dot selected in the grid. 
 3. Dot is a spot in the grid. 
 4. Stroke is a straight line connecting two or more 
dots in the grid.  
Validity 
“The main motivation for graphical passwords is the 
hypothesis that people are better at remembering images 
than artificial words” (Dirik, Memon, & Birget, 2007, p. 
20). The formula and functions that were used in collecting 
data are a modification of similar ones that were used in 
the calculations of similar values in previous research 
into other graphical passwords. 
The formula and functions used in this research are 
similar to the ones used by Barker and Kelsey (2012), 
Chiasson, Stobert, Forget, Biddle, and Van Oorschot (2012), 
Passfaces Corporation (2012), Esteban, Morales, Pardo, and 




and Hutchings (2008) in their research. Even though DAS 
allows the construction of discontinued shapes, the same 
functions and formula can be applied to eAUPs. 
Organization 
This thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter 1 
is the general introduction to the research. Chapter 2 is 
the literature review. Chapter 3 describes the variables 
and methodology used to collect the data, and Chapter 4 








Technology has turned the world into a global village. 
Increasingly, research is being made into discovering ways 
to improve the global communication. After a few clicks of 
a mouse, one can access information that decades ago would 
have required an individual days of rummaging through 
library books to find. However, advancement in technology 
has created several issues in security for experts. One of 
the major concerns is the weak link of the user to a 
system. According to most researchers, human beings in a 
system have been recognized as the weakest link in computer 
systems security (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Sasse, Brostoff, & 
Weirich, 2001). 
According to Vidyaraman, Chandrasekaran, and Upadhyaya 
(2008), there are two categories of legitimate users dubbed 
“the enemy within.” For the first category, although they 
do not have any malicious intent, their actions cause 




the “saboteur,” they are legitimate users with malicious 
intent. Even though they possess legal credentials, their 
goal is to disrupt the system such as sabotaging, stealing 
information, etc.  
According to Shay et al. (2010), in their research 
into “user attitude and behavior towards stronger password 
requirements,” users’ attitude and behavior compromise the 
relevance of the security policies. For this reason, lots 
of research has been done into how to reduce the effects of 
the “weakest link” in security systems, the user. 
Several research areas that studied solving this issue 
include but are not limited to implementing stricter 
security policies, increasing the complexity of the 
existing security protocols, and discovering alternative 
methods for security.  
One of the proposed alternative methods is the use of 
graphics-based passwords as substitutes for the traditional 
username and text-based password combination. “Visual 
objects seem to offer a much larger set of usable 
passwords” (Dirik et al., 2007, p. 20). According to Zhang, 
Monrose, and Reiter (2010), users tend to vary their 
passwords by changing a few characters from the old 




school name, hometown name, or the name of someone close to 
them such as spouse, children, parents, and so on. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this literature review is to explore 
other research into graphics-based passwords and how they 
compare with a traditional username and alphanumeric 
password combinations in computer security. There is a lot 
of research in the recall ability of graphic-based 
passwords versus alphanumeric passwords, as well as the 
usability of graphical-based passwords.  
This research compares pattern-drawn graphic passwords 
similarly found on the android mobile devices with 
alphanumeric passwords. The main focus of this will be to 
propose ways of increasing the strength of a user-drawn 
pattern password based on the space, entropy, and minimum 
length of pattern-drawn passwords. Also, this research 
proposes ways of eliminating easily guessable passwords. 
 
Source and Search Criteria 
The sources for previous work and research related to 
this research were selected from a comprehensive search in 
several journals and article databases. The online journals 




Publications and Journals, EBESCOhost, ProQuest, and Wiley 
Online Library. The “Google” search engine was also used to 
expansively acquire tributary sources for amplification of 
the lexicons used in the reviewed literature. 
The following terms were used fundamentally to search 
for articles and other publications on the subject of this 
research. 
 Password strength:  According to McDowell et al. 
(2009), a password strength is a password’s degree of 
resistivity to guessing and brute-force attacks. In this 
research, password strength is a function of its space, 
density, and randomness.  
 Graphical passwords: A graphical password is a 
password that requires the user to remember an image, 
picture, or pattern-based information instead of text-based 
information (Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008). For the purpose 
of this research, graphical-based passwords is used to 
refer to user-drawn passwords (UD) (Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 
2008), picture passwords (Komanduri & Hutchings, 2008), 
click-based graphical passwords (CBG) (Forget, Chiasson, & 
Biddle, 2007, 2010), persuasive cued click-points (PCCP) 
(Spitzer, Singh, & Schweitzer, 2010), cued gaze-points 




schemes (Dirik et al., 2007). 
 Authentication: According to the RSA information 
security glossary, authentication is a procedure where a 
person or a computer program verifies their identity in 
order to access information (Czekalski, 2012). 
 Text, text-based, and alphanumeric passwords:  
Represent passwords that use ASCII and other forms of 
characters, which include but are not limited to alphabets, 
numbers, and other symbols. 
 
Users’ Behavior and Attitude Toward Passwords 
One of the major problems in computer security is “how 
to authenticate a user securely and conveniently” (Shay et 
al., 2010, p. 1). “Authentication is typically the first 
step toward confirming that a user is authorized to perform 
a requested action, be it retrieving email, withdrawing 
money from an ATM, or issuing commands to a power-
distribution grid” (Shay et al., 2010, p. 1). Even though 
text-based passwords still remain the most commonly used 
method of authentication, user behavior and attitude make 
it unpredictable. 
Shay et al. (2010) conducted research on the attitude 
of users towards new password policies at Carnegie Mellon 




old and new policies and also the attitude of the users to 
these new policies. Their study provided new insights into 
the behavior and attitudes of users towards strict password 
policies. These insights are outlined as follows: 
 1. Users find new requirements annoying but believe 
they provide security. 
2. Some users struggle to comply with new password 
requirements. 
3. Users are more likely to share and reuse their 
passwords than to write them down. 
4. Users tend to modify old passwords to create new 
ones. 
5. Users are more likely to share their passwords over 
time (about 25% had shared their passwords with at least 
one person). 
6. Use of dictionary words and names are still the 
most common strategies to create passwords (about 80% of 
the participants had passwords based on names and 
dictionary words). 
In concluding, they realized that the results were 
inconsistent with some of the assumptions of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). “NIST bases 




that are inconsistent with our findings” (Shay et al., 
2010, p. 12).  
However, if their population sample was from an 
academic demography, it raises the question of whether it 
is the same demography that NIST based their assumptions 
on. 
According to Sasse et al. (2001), even though text 
passwords are required to be memorable and secured, “most 
passwords are either memorable but easy-to-guess or secure 
but difficult-to-remember” (Stobert, 2010, p. 4304). 
Usually users tend to choose between memorability and 
security. For example, it will be easier for a user to 
modify an existing password to make a new one than to 
create a new password from scratch, since it will be easy 
for the user to remember a slightly modified password than 
a newly created one. 
“Two common techniques for helping people to remember 
complex passwords are to use pass phrases and 
substitutions” (Holt, 2011, p. 37). For example, a pass 
phrase such as “My birthday is first January 2001” can be 
represented as a password as “Mbdi1j01,” and in using 
substitutions, a user can replace the letters of a word 




example, “Friday” can be represented as “t49rw7.” However, 
users tend to use the same password for several sites 
(Sasse et al., 2001), hence once the password is determined 
for one site, it may be applicable to several other sites. 
Background of Graphical Passwords 
Several graphical password schemes have been produced 
on the premise that an image is easier to remember than 
text-based passwords (Dunphy & Yan, 2007). Dirik et al. 
(2007) classify password systems as: (a) Recognition-
based systems (RBS); (b) Cued recall-based systems 
(CRBS); and (c) Pure recall-based systems (PRBS). 
 
Recognition-Based Systems 
In this type of password system, a user must 
recognize a set of previously selected set of images, 
symbol, or icons from a large collection for 
authentication (Dirik et al., 2007). An example of an RBS 
scheme is Passfaces (a commercial scheme).  
Passfaces is a scheme where user authentication is 
done by selecting a set of pre-selected facial images out 
of a stock of images (Dunphy, Heiner, & Asokan, 2010). 
Research into a mobile implementation of this scheme used 




towards this type of scheme on mobile devices. 
Though their survey was short-termed (they 
recommended a longitudinal study), it provided helpful 
insight into real-world performance levels expected of 
recognition-based schemes. Although their method of 
calculating the entropy was not stated, it is assumed 
that they used Shannon’s method (Shannon, 2001). Also, 
their observations showed that the choice of facial 
images was influenced by the ethnicity of the user. 
 
Cued Recall-Based Systems 
Human recall of long-term memory is usually tied to 
an activity or event. Hence, capturing these events in 
the form of pictures or other visual form can be used as 
a roadmap to recalling otherwise “lost memory” (Gyorbiro, 
Larkin, & Cohen, 2010a, 2010b) CRBS passwords employ the 
use of images to aid recall of passwords. To 
authenticate, a user selects several points on an image 
or a series of images as a password (Chiasson, Forget, 
Stobert, Van Oorschot, & Biddle, 2009; Chiasson et al., 
2012; Stobert, 2010a; Stobert, Forget, Chiasson, Van 
Oorschot, & Biddle, 2010b). A sample password scheme that 
uses CRBS is a passpoint password.  




chosen by a user in an image that is displayed on the 
screen” (Dirik et al., 2007, p. 20). Another example is 
the “persuasive cued click-points” (PCCP) (Chiasson, 
Forget, Biddle, & Van Oorschot, 2008; Chiasson et al., 
2012) which is similar to the passpoints.  
Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP) is a click-based 
graphical password system in which a user is 
presented with a number of images in sequence, and is 
asked to choose one click-point on each image. The 
first image is assigned by the system, but each 
subsequent image in the sequence is determined by the 
user’s previous click. This means that clicking in 
different places on an earlier image leads the user 
to different next images. (Stobert, 2010, p. 4304) 
 
Calculating the theoretical space of a PCCP, 
according to Stobert (2010, p. 4304), was based on the 
following formula: w is the width of the image, h is the 
height of the image, t is the size of the tolerance 
square, and c is the number of click points. 
 
Pure Recall-Based Systems 
A PRB can be defined as a password system where “a 
user is asked to reproduce something (e.g. a drawing or a 
sequence of actions) that he or she created or selected 
earlier during the registration stage” (Suo, Zhu, & Owen, 
2006, p. 742). The main reason behind PRB systems, 
according to Jermyn et al. (1999), is that they “have shown 




recall and recognition with pictorial representations of 
to-be-remembered material than for verbal representations” 
(p. 3). 
The most popular PRB system password scheme is the 
Draw-A-Secret (DAS) scheme. The DAS uses a canvas that has 
a grid of cells. Each cell has a coordinate (h,w) where h 
is the horizontal value and w is the vertical value. A 
password of the DAS consists of the cells that an image or 
a drawing passes through (Jermyn et al., 1999). 
According to Jermyn et al. (1999), two factors that 
make DAS strong are: (a) Users do not pick passwords 
uniformly, and (b) An attack does not have a significant 
knowledge of the user’s password distribution. 
AUP is similar to DAS but, unlike DAS, cell or dot (in 
AUP) repetition is not possible. Oorschot and Thorpe (2008) 
contributed to this password scheme by introducing a model 
for predicting weak passwords. In computing the space of a 
DAS, Jermyn et al. (1999) assumed that passwords of a 
length greater than a certain length had a probability of 
zero.  
Definition of Variables 
Password Space 




possible character combinations as a function of the number 
of characters and the maximum length of the password 
(Jermyn et al., 1999; Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2005; Van 
Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008). The size of the password space 
has an upper bound and a lower bound. The upper bound size 
is the number of all possible characters. The calculation 
of the lower bound size varies depending on the type of 
password scheme.  
For RBS passwords, Suo et al. (2006) computed the 
password space as: 
�
(𝑛 + 𝑙 − 1)!
𝑙! (𝑛 − 1)!
𝑚
𝑙=1
  −     (1) 
where n is the total number of pictures, l is the password 
length, and m is the maximum password length, assuming that 
a picture can be selected more than once. 
For PRBS passwords, Suo et al. (2006) proposed that if 
the drawing is allowed to pass through multiple units or 




   −     (2) 
However if the scheme does not allow the drawing to 
pass through the same pixel or unit multiple times, then 









   −       (3) 
 
Minimum Length 
The minimum length of a password for a password scheme 
is the minimum number of character sequence needed to 
achieve a given password strength (entropy) in bits 
(Chiasson et al., 2008; Dunphy & Yan, 2007; Forget et al., 
2010; Jermyn et al., 1999; Komanduri & Hutchings, 2008; 
Yokota, Ootsu, & Baba, 2007). 
Using the information-theory entropy based on 
Shannon’s entropy (Shannon, 2001), the minimum length can 
be computed as follows: 
𝐿 =  
𝐻
log2 𝑁
   −      (4) 
where H is the desired entropy and N the number of possible 
passwords (“Password Strength,” 2012). 
The minimum length of a password is needed to 
determine the least number of characters in a password 
needed to achieve certain strength. 
 
Entropy 
The entropy is a statistical parameter which measures 
in a certain sense, how much information is produced 
on the average for each letter of a text in the 




digits (0 or 1) in the most efficient way, the entropy 
H is the average number of binary digits required per 
letter of the original language. (Burr, Dodson, & 
Polk, 2006, p. 46) 
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
also defines entropy as a degree of the disorder, 
uncertainty, or unpredictability in a closed system (Barker 
& Kelsey, 2012; Burr et al., 2006; Komanduri & Hutchings, 
2008; Milton & Kennedy, 2010; Wong & Chen, 2006; Zhang et 
al., 2010) 
Information entropy, usually used as a measure (in 
bits) for the strength of a password, is a concept from 
information theory which implies that for a password of 
strength 64 bits will require 264 attempts during a brute 
force search to exhaust all possibilities (“Password 
Strength,” n.d.). 
Shannon (2001) describes entropy as a measure of 
uncertainty and hence proposed that: 
𝐻(𝑁) =  −�𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
log𝑝𝑖     −        (5) 
where pi is the probability of a sequence occurring in a 
space. Milton and Kennedy (2010) suggested that the 
frequency fa of a symbol a in an arbitrary list of N symbols 







METHODOLOGY AND INSTRUMENTATION 
Introduction 
This research and its instruments are designed to 
measure the strength of an eAUP password based on the 
space, minimum length, and entropy. This method helped me 
answer the question: Does an eAUP have the comparable 
strength and complexity of a text-based password?  
Type of Research 
The methodology for this study is a comparative 
experimental quantitative research design. This method was 
selected because in order to determine what parameters of 
an eAUP meet the minimum strength of the current text-based 
password standard, the minimum length, the space, entropy, 
and strength of the eAUP need to be computed. The purpose 
of this research design was to enable me to compute the 
entropy, space, and minimum length of all possible eAUPs.  
This design was also selected because of its 
usefulness and versatility in aiding me to manipulate 





There are three dependent variables and one 
independent variable, which is the screen resolution. Hence 
the null hypothesis is identified as follows: 
 H0: The space N, entropy H, and minimum Length Lmin of a 
text-based password are equal to the space N, entropy H, 
and minimum Length Lmin of any eAUP. 
 Mathematically,  
𝑁𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 =  ∀ 𝑁𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃 and 𝐻𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 =  ∀ 𝐻𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃 and 𝐿𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 =  ∀ 𝐿𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃    
The null hypothesis will be rejected if the level of 
significance is below 0.05. 
Definitions of Functions in eAUP Password 
Figure 1 shows a 10-by-10 eAUP grid. 
 
 
       Figure 1. A sample grid. 
 




the dimension of the grid may be a square or rectangle) 
that can be connected to each other; h is the number of 
horizontal dots and v is the number of vertical dots. 
Hence, the size of the grid can be computed. Theoretically, 
an eAUP password can be defined as a set of interconnected 
strokes (s). Therefore, the Length (LeAUP) of an eAUP 
password can be determined as the number of strokes in the 
password. 
Mathematically: 
 𝐿𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃 =  ∀𝑠     −    (6),  
where ∀𝑠 = number of strokes in the pattern. 
Since a stroke (s) is a line connecting two or more 
dots (D), the minimum size (mins) of a stroke is two Ds and 
the maximum possible size (maxs) is maximum (m,n)D, where it 
is possible to connect a straight line across the longest 
side of the grid. Since the mins can be a subset of maxs of 
a stroke and the size of mins = 2, then the number of mins 
in maxs can be computed as: 
(𝑁�𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠) =  
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠
2� �    ≅  ℵ     −    (7)  
where, ℵ means rounded down to the nearest whole number, 
since mins cannot be a single dot. Hence the shortest stroke 
smin can be a line between two neighboring Ds. If a dot is 




v in the grid as (h,v), then its neighbors can be any 
possible combination of {D(h-1,v), D(h-1,v+1), D(h,v+1), D(h+1,v+1), 
D(h+1,v), D(h+1,v-1), D(h,v-1), D(h-1,v-1)}. Hence the length of an 
eAUP password can be defined in terms of minD as: 
𝐿𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃 = 𝑛 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐷)    −     (8) 
From the fourth assumption, the number of strokes n in 




    −      (9) 
where 𝑡 = (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐷 +  𝐷1𝐷2�������)2. The entropy (Yokota et al., 
2007) of a random character in a text-based password is 
defined as:  
𝐻 = 𝐿 ×  
log 𝑛
log 2
       −     (10)  
Using extended ASCII characters and the current 
password policy of a minimum password length of eight 
characters, 
N = 218 for printable extended characters 
L = 8 characters 
then, H = 62.1454745982154, approximately 64 bits. 
Therefore 64 bits can be used as a baseline to calculate 
the minimum length of strokes needed by any grid to satisfy 





Instruments for Computing Variables 
Minimum Length for H 
Given the entropy, the minimum length of characters in 
a space can be computed as: 
𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛 =  𝐻
(log𝑛log 2)
�         −          (11) 
The length of a stroke in an eAUP password cannot be 
pre-determined since users can be unpredictable, therefore 
it will range between mins = 2 and maxs which depends on the 
longest side. 
Space 
Since the longest stroke can be expressed in terms of 
the smallest stroke (2 dots), the mins is used to compute 
the total space. Also, eAUP does not allow the same dot to 
be used multiple times, thus using the minimum password 
space for PRBS, the space of eAUP is computed as: 





     −       (12) 
N is computed to the nearest lower bound whole number. 
Entropy 
Due to the nature of an eAUP, it is assumed that the 
probability of selecting a dot is dependent on the 




formula for calculating the entropy of a character 
(Shannon, 2001), which is  
𝐻(𝑋) =  −  �𝑝(𝑥𝑖) log𝑏 𝑝(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
        −            (13) 
Even though Shannon’s entropy is not fitting to 
compute the entropy of an eAUP (due to the continuous 
nature of eAUP patterns), it is used in this research for 
simplicity. A more appropriate method is Markov’s m order 
data process (Hornbeck, 1975; MacRae, 1977). Markov’s 
first-order data process (where 𝑝(𝑥𝑖) log𝑏 𝑝(𝑥𝑖) is the 
probability mass function of outcome xi and n the space) is:  




    −           (14) 
where, 
 P (Dn-1) = probability of previous dot and P (Dn) is the 










RESULTS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION 
Design 
Using the screen resolution of popular screen sizes, a 
theoretical grid was created that covered the entire 
screen. It was assumed that a dot had a diameter of 5 
pixels and each dot is 10 pixels apart. This gave off a 
square tolerance of 15px * 15px equivalent to a square 
tolerance area of 225 pixels. See Appendix A for the code 
of the grid. The size of the smallest screen was 640 by 480 
pixels (VGA), and the size of the largest screen was 2560 
by 1600 pixels (WQXGA). The entire screen was used, 
assuming that the entire screen can be a canvas for the 
eAUP grid.  
A stand-alone java application was used to compute the 
values for analyzing the eAUP grid. See Appendix A. The 
application was executed on an Intel i5 core computer with 
8GB RAM. The difficulty in constructing a real eAUP grid 





 The resolutions of 22 different screen types were used 
as parameters for application. Table 1 shows the types of 
the screen and their resolutions. 
                 Table 1  
Types of Screens and Their Resolutions 
Screen Resolution 
VGA  640 X 480 
SVGA  800 X 600 
WSVGA  1024 X 600 
XGA  1024 X 768 
XGA+  1152 X 864 
WXGA  1280 X 720 
WXGA  1280 X 768 
WXGA  1280 X 800 
SXGA  1280 X 960 
SXGA  1280 X 1024 
HD  1360 X 768 
HD  1366 X 768 
SXGA+  1400 X 1050 
WXGA+  1440 X 900 
HD+  1600 X 900 
UXGA  1600 X 1200 
WSXGA+  1680 X 1050 
FHD  1920 X 1080 
WUXGA  1920 X 1200 
QWXGA  2048 X 1152 
WQHD  2560 X 1440 





Due to my limited computing capabilities, the password 
space for the eAUP grids could not be computed. See 
Appendix B. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of dots 




Figure 2. The height and width distribution of the screens. 
 
 
While the number of strokes in the length of the grid 
increased steadily, the number of strokes dropped along the 




































































Size n of the grid 






The initial assumption of this research was that the 
size of the grid will follow a linear trend. However, from 
Figure 3, the data show that the size of the grid follows a 
polynomial of the order of 5, which may be due to the 








However the entropy for a pattern of length 8 mins for 
the screens follows a linear trend on the line y = 1.0237x 
+ 79.364. See Figure 4. 
 
y = 0.0157x5 - 0.781x4 + 15.919x3 - 


































Size of Grid (strokes) 
Size of Grid (strokes)






         Figure 4. The trend of the Entropy of patterns of length 8                                                     




Figure 5 shows that the graphs for the Lmin follow a 
power trend where the base is approximately 
𝐻
8
 and power is 
approximately -0.093. Hence given H, 



















    Figure 5. The minimum length in strokes. 
 
Detecting Familiar Shapes 
Matte and Warren (2006) describe a line segment in 
geometry as a line that is confined by two distinct end 
points, and contains every point on the line between its 
end points. From the definition, a stroke can be a line 
segment between dots  where DS is the beginning dot with 
position Ds(hs,vs) and DE is the ending dot with position 
DE(hE,vE). 
It is assumed that all strokes in the grid are 
straights lines that are horizontal, vertical, or diagonal 
at an angle of 45o. This will cause all strokes to connect 
all dots within points Ds and DE. Another assumption is that 
y = 6.9667x-0.095 
y = 13.899x-0.097 
y = 27.195x-0.089 
















Size of Grid n 
 Lmin H= 64
 Lmin H= 128
 Lmin H= 256
 Lmin H= 512
Power ( Lmin H= 64)
Power ( Lmin H= 128)
Power ( Lmin H= 256)




once a dot is used by a stroke in a grid, it cannot be 
reused as a starting dot of a stroke or an ending dot to a 
stroke. Also, the end dot is determined when the direction 
of the stroke changes. The change in direction can be any 
one of the following: vertical up (↑), vertical down (↓), 
horizontal left (←), horizontal right (→), diagonal up 
right (), diagonal up left (), diagonal down left (), 
and diagonal down right (). 
Additionally, a middle stroke s can have only two 
neighboring strokes since the pattern is drawn continuously 
except the starting stroke (the first stroke in the 
pattern) and ending stroke (the last stroke in the 
pattern), which can have only one neighbor. The neighbor sn 
of a stroke s is such that the beginning or ending dot of 
sn is equal to the starting or ending dot of s. 
Mathematically, 
𝑠 ∩ 𝑠𝑛 ≠  ∅      −         (15) 
However, for the starting stroke s, a neighbor sn is 
such that,  
𝐷 𝐸𝑠 (ℎ𝐸 , 𝑣𝐸)  =     𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑛 (ℎ𝑆, 𝑣𝑆)     −       (16) 
And the reverse is true for the ending stroke e such 
that, 




Even though the pattern is open-ended meaning,   
𝐷 𝐸𝑒 (ℎ𝐸 , 𝑣𝐸)  ≠     𝐷𝑠𝑠 (ℎ𝑆, 𝑣𝑆)     −       (18) 
the pattern can have vertices for closed shapes like 
squares, rectangles, triangles, and more. Hence a vertex 
dot Dv can be: 
 1. DV such that it is the starting dot Ds and ending 
dot DE of two neighboring strokes such that: 
𝐷𝑣  =     𝐷𝑆    =       𝐷𝐸          −     (19) 
 2. Also DV is the intersection of two non-neighboring 
strokes such that: 
𝑆𝑚  ∩     𝑆𝑛    =       𝐷𝑣          −     (20) 
In order to detect common or familiar shapes and 
patterns, I used the existing properties of these shapes to 
detect their existence in an eAUP password.  
Square 
A square is a four-sided regular polygon with all 
edges equal, all internal angles are 90°, and whose 
position on the coordinate plane is determined by the 
coordinates of the four vertices (corners) (Page, 2012). 





       Figure 6. A square ABCD. 
 
 
Using the properties of a square, a square pattern 
ABCD can be found in a pattern if, 
1. All dots between vertices {DA, DB, DC, DD} are 
active.  
2. |AB|=  |BC|=  |CD|  =  |DA| 
3. <ABC= <BAC= <BCD= <CDA=90° 













 A rectangle is similar to a square except that only 
the two parallel line segments are equal. Figure 7 shows a 
sample rectangle with vertices ABCD.  
 
 
 Figure 7. A rectangle ABCD. 
 
Using these properties, a rectangle in an eAUP can be 
detected based on the following conditions: 
1. All dots between vertices {DA, DB, DC, DD} are 
active.  
2. |AB|=  |CD| and  |BC|  =  |DA| 
3. <ABC= <BAC= <BCD= <CDA=90° 
4. |AB|  ‖  |CD| and |BC| ‖ |AD| 
Zigzag 




variable angles, though perpetual within the zigzag, 
outlining a route between two parallel lines; it can be 
defined as both jagged and fairly regular (“Zigzag,” 2012). 
Zigzags can be irregular, but due to time constraints, this 
research was limited to only regular zigzags, which can be 
traced through two parallel lines and the alternating line 
segments are parallel to each other.  
To find the angle between strokes in a pattern, the 
Euclidean calculations can be used (Weisstein, 2012). For a 
zigzag pattern to be detected, the dot products of all 
neighboring lines need to be computed. Assuming two 
neighboring strokes are denoted by s1 and s2 where s1 is 
bounded by |Ds1De1| where Ds1 = (hs1, vs1) and De1 = (he1, ve1). 
Then, 
∆ℎ𝑠1 =  ℎ𝑠1 −  ℎ𝑒1 - (21) and  
∆𝑣𝑠1 =  𝑣𝑠1 −  𝑣𝑒11 - (22) 
Hence,  
s1 = (hs1, vs1)  - (23)and  
s2 = (hs2, vs2) - (24) 
Applying Euclidean calculations, an angle 𝜃 between s1 
and s2 is 




 𝜃 = cos−1 �(∆ℎ𝑠1− ∆𝑣𝑠1) ×  (∆ℎ𝑠2− ∆𝑣𝑠2)|∆ℎ𝑠1 −  ∆𝑣𝑠1| |∆ℎ𝑠2 −  ∆𝑣𝑠2| �  - (26) 
Assuming that Dv1 is the dot that connects s1 and s2, 
Dv2 is the dot that connects s2 and s3, and Dv3 connects s3 
and s4. Then to detect a zigzag, there must be a change of 
direction at each of the dots (in opposite direction) of 
each of the strokes at an angle of about 𝜽. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The formulae used in this research may be error-prone, 
but they give significant results that can help guide 
future research into an eAUP scheme. From the two-way t 
test = 6.36033E-09 on space and entropy, there is no 
significant difference between the grid size n and the 
entropy H of a password of length 8. Hence the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Even though each stroke is made of a straight line, by 
increasing the grid, the length of the minimum stroke can 
be reduced so that they can be used to construct curves 
within the grid.  
Future work that can be done includes considering the 
continuous nature of the pattern in the calculations of 












CODE USED FOR COMPUING RESULTS 
Grid.java 
/** 




 * @author Joseph Abandoh-Sam 
 */ 
public class Grid { 
     
    private int m = 0; 
    private int v = 0; 
    private int size; 
    private String name = null; 
     
    public Grid ( String name,int mtemp, int ntemp){ 
        this.name = name; 
        m = mtemp/15; 
        v = ntemp/15; 
         
        size = (m * v)/2; 
        //System.out.println(size); 
    } 
     
    public int getM(){ 
        return m; 
    } 
     
    public int getV(){ 
        return v; 
    } 
    public String getName(){ 
        return this.name; 
    } 




    public double f(double x){ 
        //return (Math.log(x)/Math.log(2)); 
        return (1/x )* (Math.log(1/x)/Math.log(2)); 
    } 
     
     
    //from  
    private double integrate(double a, double b, int N) { 
      double h = (b - a) / N;              // step size 
      double sum = 0.5 * (f(a) + f(b));    // area 
      for (int i = 1; i < N; i++) { 
         double x = a + h * i; 
         sum = sum + f(x); 
      } 
 
      return sum * h; 
    } 
     
    public int getSize(){ 
        return size; 
    } 
         
    //returns the space for the grid. 
    public long getN(){ 
        double sum = 0; 
        for(int l = 2; l <= Math.max(m, v); l++){ 
            sum = sum + (factorial(size)/factorial(size - 
l)); 
        } 
        return Math.round(sum); 
    } 
     
    //returns the min number of strokes for  
    public long Lmin (int H){ 
        return Math.round(H/(Math.log(size)/Math.log(2))); 
    } 
     
    //calculate the factorial of a number. 
    private double factorial (int n){ 
        double fact = 1; 
        if (n <= 1) { 
     return 1; 
 } 
  
 else { 




                fact = fact*i; 
                System.out.println(fact); 
            } 
            return fact; 
        } 
    } 
     
    public int entropy(int l){ 
        int H = 0; 
         
        for(int i = 0; i <= l; i++){ 
            //H = H + ((1/(size-i)) * l * ();             
        } 
         
        H = (int) (l * (Math.log(size) / 
Math.log(2)));//(int)integrate(2,size, size-2); 
         
        //double sum1 = 0.0; // the two summations in the 
equation. 
                 
        return H; 
    } 









 * Calculate the values for each grid 







public class Running { 
     
     
    private static Grid grid; 
     
    public static void initialize()throws Exception{ 
        //fstream = new FileWriter("input.txt"); 
        //out = new BufferedWriter(fstream); 
    } 
    public static void main (String args[]){ 
        //grid = new Grid(100,100); 
        Scanner sc = null; 
        int m = 1024, n = 768; 
        try { 
            sc = new Scanner(new 
FileReader("D:\\test\\grid_input.txt")); 
            sc.useDelimiter(" "); 
        } catch (FileNotFoundException ex) { 
            
Logger.getLogger(Running.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, 
null, ex); 
        } 
         
         
        grid = new Grid(args[0], Integer.parseInt(args[1]), 
Integer.parseInt(args[2])); 
     
        System.out.println(grid.getName()+", "+ grid.getM() 
+ ", " + grid.getV() + ", " + grid.getSize()+", " + 
grid.entropy(8)+ ", " + grid.Lmin(64) 
            + ", " + grid.Lmin(128)+ ", " + grid.Lmin(256)+ 
", " + grid.Lmin(512)); 
                




    } 
     









TABLE OF RESULTS 











VGA 42 32 672 75 7 14 27 55 
SVGA 53 40 1060 80 6 13 25 51 
WSVGA 68 40 1360 83 6 12 25 49 
XGA 68 51 1734 86 6 12 24 48 
XGA+ 76 57 2166 88 6 12 23 46 
WXGA 85 48 2040 87 6 12 23 47 
WXGA 85 51 2167 88 6 12 23 46 
WXGA 85 53 2252 89 6 11 23 46 
SXGA 85 64 2720 91 6 11 22 45 
SXGA 85 68 2890 91 6 11 22 45 
HD 90 51 2295 89 6 11 23 46 
HD 91 51 2320 89 6 11 23 46 
SXGA+ 93 70 3255 93 5 11 22 44 
WXGA+ 96 60 2880 91 6 11 22 45 
HD+ 106 60 3180 93 6 11 22 44 
UXGA 106 80 4240 96 5 11 21 42 
WSXGA+ 112 70 3920 95 5 11 21 43 
FHD 128 72 4608 97 5 11 21 42 
WUXGA 128 80 5120 98 5 10 21 42 
QWXGA 136 76 5168 98 5 10 21 42 
WQHD 170 96 8160 103 5 10 20 39 
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